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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
should not be permitted to frustrate the peaceful settlement of disputes to
the detriment of the public's interest.8 2
Should it become evident that employers and the courts take undue
advantage of Avco's narrow anti-strike injunction such that it fosters a
situation similar to that which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended
to correct,83 the application of a presumption of arbitrability to such cases
should be reconsidered. However, it is not believed that the narrow situa-
tions in which strike injunctions are available will lead to such a result;
the necessary safeguards are built into the basic requirements for the
issuance of the injunction. 4
The decision of the instant case further clarified and necessarily ex-
panded the situations in which a Boys Markets injunction can be obtained.
It properly demonstrates that there need not be mutual ability to initiate
arbitration of a dispute for the parties to be "contractually bound to arbi-
trate." The application of the presumption of arbitrability, coupled with
the determination of when parties are bound to arbitration, leads to the
proper enforcement of the contractual obligations of both parties, without
relinquishing any legal right the parties had under the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
J. Michael Fieglein
LABOR LAW - OVERTIME WAGES - INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS
CAN BE OBLIGATED TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINIMUM WAGE LAW.
Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co. (D.C. Cir. 1972)
Plaintiffs, 92 bus drivers, brought a class action suit against their
employer, W.M.A. Transit Company,' to recover unpaid overtime com-
pensation allegedly due them under the District of Columbia Minimum
Wage Act (DCMWA).2 The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss, reasoning that, since a great majority of defendant's vehicles
82. Curtin, Boys Markets and the No-Strike Injunction, 57 A.B.A.J. 863, 866
(1971).
83. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
1. Defendant operated contract, charter, and route bus service in and around
the District of Columbia. Defendant's offices were located within Maryland, yet
very proximate to the District, but no facilities were maintained within the District.
The bulk of defendant's business involved the operation of 84 regular bus routes,
79 of which entered the District. Defendant's drivers were required to have both
District of Columbia and Maryland licenses. Defendant estimated that its drivers
spent, on the average, 38 per cent of their total pay time within the District. Williams
v. W.M.A. Transit Co., __ F.2d ------- -----.(D.C. Cir. 1972). vacating and remanding
268 A.2d 261 (D.C. 1970).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-401 et seq. (1967).
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were engaged in interstate commerce, defendant was subject to regulation
by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) and there-
fore, the DCMWA was inapplicable to defendant's drivers.3 The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Congress intended
to extend the coverage of the DCMWA only to those individuals working
entirely within the District of Columbia.4 Plaintiffs then appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
That court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded, holding
that the operative scope of the DCMWA included employees who regu-
larly spent more than 50 per cent of their work time in the District of
Columbia and employees who, though they did not regularly spend 50
per cent of their work time in the District or in any particular state, were
based5 in the District and regularly spent a substantial amount of work
time in the District. Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co ........ F.2d ......
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
The noteworthiness of the decision in Williams may not be readily
apparent. While the holding concerned the operative scope of a local
minimum wage statute and while W.M.A. Transit was a local company,
it was nevertheless an interstate motor carrier," and the decision can, there-
fore, be construed as setting precedent which could prove to have a signifi-
cant impact on the interstate motor carrier industry. The wage structure
in much of that industry is not readily adaptable to an hourly overtime
wage requirement such as the one established by the DCMWA. The
wages of interstate truckers, for example, are determined, not on a strict
hourly basis, but rather by means of complex, collectively bargained
formulae under which wage rates may vary with the type of trip, type of
equipment driven, cargo hauled, distance traveled, terrain, and even road
speed.7 It is obvious that it would be difficult to compute the overtime
wages of a trucker, paid according to such formulae, on the basis of time
and one-half of a nonexistent hourly rate.8 The imposition of an overtime
wage provision inconsistent with a collectively bargained wage agreement
could force the renegotiation of that agreement and, where the wage agree-
ment is industry-wide, that renegotiation could result in significant indus-
trial strife, thereby adversely affecting the national economic climate.9
Heretofore, labor and management in the trucking industry have success-
3. Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 268 A.2d 261, 262 (D.C. 1970).
4. Id. at 263.
5. The term "based" refers to that place to which an employee reports for
duty -......F.2d at ......
6. See 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1970).
7. Hearings on H.R. 10948 and H.R. 17596 Before the General Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 874,
877-80 (1970) (Remarks of Mr. Harry Brodeur of the American Trucking Associa-
tions) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
8. Many of the collectively bargained wage agreements which exist throughout
the interstate motor carrier industry do not require hourly overtime payments.
However, they do contain other benefits which are intended to offset the absence of
specific hourly overtime payment provisions. Id. at 875.
9. Id.
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fully opposed the imposition of federal overtime wage requirements on the
interstate motor carrier industry, 10 and the industry has been generally
free from state overtime wage regulation.1 Since the Williams decision
can be read as inviting state regulation of the overtime wages of employees
of interstate motor carriers and because of the possible wide-ranging effects
of such regulation, the opinion warrants detailed consideration.
In 1935, in response to the rapid growth of interstate motor carrier
activity and the plethora of state attempts to regulate it, Congress enacted
the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 (the "Motor Carrier Act").12 That Act
gave, inter alia, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and sub-
sequently the Secretary of Transportation,1 3 the authority and duty to set
qualifications and maximum hours of service for certain employees 14 of
interstate motor carriers. 15 Three years later, Congress enacted the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)O as a step towards the elimination
of "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-being
of workers."'17 To accomplish that purpose, the FLSA established among
other provisions, minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime wage
standards. 8  In order to avoid the probable conflict inherent in the possi-
10. Id. at 876.
11. In June 1971, the circuit court asked counsel to submit supplementary memo-
randa concerning whether or not there were any applicable judicial, administrative,
or executive rulings from states, whose minimum wage laws did not contain express
exemptions from their overtime wage provisions for employees with respect to
whom the DOT had the power to regulate maximum hours of service and qualifications(see notes 12-15 and accompanying text infra), concerning whether or not the FLSA
motor carrier exemption (see text accompanying notes 17-19 infra) implied that
such employees were exempt from the overtime pay provisions of the state statutes.Counsel made inquiry to the 48 continental states, received replies from 29, butfound only two rulings on point. F.2d at ___ n.9. The Attorney General of Mainehad ruled, in 1966, that the FLSA motor carrier exemption applied to the states,
while the Attorney General of Maryland had ruled, in 1970, that the exemption did
not apply. Id. at -...... However, less than one year after the Maryland Attorney
General had expressed that view, it was evidently repudiated by the MarylandAssembly which amended the Maryland overtime wage provisions to specificallyinclude a motor carrier exemption. Id. at __ n.10. Additionally, the Commissioner
of the Connecticut State Department of Labor has since ruled that, effective April29, 1972, any driver or helper subject to maximum hours regulation by the DOTis exempt from the Connecticut overtime wage requirements. 4 BNA LAB. REL.
REP., SLL 16:309 (1972).12. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). The short title of the Act was changedfrom Motor Carrier Act, 1935 to part II of the Interstate Commerce Act on Sept.
18, 1940. Ch. 722, tit. I, § 15, 54 Stat. 919.13. In 1966, the functions, powers, and duties of the ICC were transferred to
the Secretary of Transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1655(e) (6) (A)-(D) (1970). In this
note reference will be made to both the ICC and the DOT as is appropriate. Reference
will be made to an "ICC-DOT" regulation in situations where regulations may have
been promulgated by either or both agencies.
14. The grant of power to set qualifications and maximum hours of serviceis limited to those employees whose activities involve the safety of operation of
motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce. Those employees have been defined
as drivers, drivers' helpers, loaders, and mechanics. 29 C.F.R. §§ 782.0-.8 (Supp.1972). For regulations setting qualifications and maximum driving and on-duty time,
see 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.11, 395.3 (Supp. 1972).
15. 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1)-(3) (1970).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
17. Id. § 202.
18. Id. §§ 206, 207.
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bility of having hours of service regulated by two governmental agencies
(by the ICC under the Motor Carrier Act and by the Department of Labor
under the FLSA) and in recognition of the ICC's existing power to
regulate the maximum hours of service of certain employees of interstate
motor carriers, Congress exempted, from the overtime provisions of the
FLSA, "any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce
Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours
of service pursuant to the provision of section 204 of the Motor Carrier
Act, 1935" (the "motor carrier exemption"). 19
Until 1966, the FLSA was the only law which afforded minimum
wage coverage and protection to men working within the District of
Columbia.20 In that year, Congress completely revised the District's 1918
minimum wage law, utilizing the FLSA as a guide,21 by amending the
DCMWA to extend coverage to all employees, as defined therein.
22
Specific exemptions were granted from both its minimum wage and over-
time provisions, 2 yet the motor carrier exemption, which Congress not
19. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 13(b) (1), 52 Stat. 1068, as
amended 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (1970).
At the time the motor carrier exemption was adopted, Senator Black stated:
It . . . would be certainly unwise to have the hours of service regulated by two
governmental agencies. . . . [T]he Interstate Commerce Commission, since it
has the power and has exercised it, should be the agency to be entrusted with
this duty.
81 CONG. REc. 7875 (1937). See H.R. REP. No. 91-1672, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61
(1970).
20. The District of Columbia's first minimum wage law was passed in 1918 and
was directed toward the protection of women and children. Act of Sept. 19, 1918,
ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960. The 1918 law remained, with a few changes, the District of
Columbia's minimum wage statute until 1966, when, finally, men generally were
provided minimum wage and overtime protection at the local level. D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-401 et seq. (1967).
21. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. 749 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Morse) ; 111 CONG.
REc. 14860 (1965) (remarks of Mr. Broyhill).
22. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-402(5) (1967) provides:
(5) The term "employee" includes any individual employed by an employer,
except that such term shall not include-
(A) any individual who, without payment and without expectation of
any gain, directly or indirectly, volunteers to engage in the activities of an
educational, charitable, religious, or nonprofit organization;
(B) any lay member elected or appointed to office within the discipline
of any religious organization and engaged in religious functions; or
(C) any individual employed in domestic service or otherwise employed,
in or about the residence of the employer.
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-404 (1967) provides the following exemptions:
(a) The minimum wage and overtime provisions of section 36-403 shall not
apply with respect to-
(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity, or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are
defined by the Secretary of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938) ; or
(2) any employee engaged in the delivery of newspapers to the home
of the consumer.
(b) The overtime provisions of section 36-403(b) (1) shall not apply with
respect to--
(1) any employee employed as a seaman;
(2) any employee employed by a railroad;
(3) any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling
or servicing automobiles, trailers, or trucks if employed by a nonmanufacturing
DECEM BER 1972]
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only had written into the FLSA, but also had steadfastly refused to
remove24 from that Act, was not present. As a result of the absence of
the motor carrier exemption in the DCMWA, the Commissioners of the
District of Columbia interpreted that Act as including, within its overtime
provisions, employees of interstate motor carriers.2 5
The instant litigation presented the question of whether the overtime
provisions of the DCMWA were intended to be applicable to interstate
motor carriers, as the Commissioners had ruled, or whether it was intended
that interstate motor carriers be exempt from those provisions, as had
been expressly provided in the FLSA. In order to answer that ques-
tion, the Williams court sought to determine the legislative intent behind
the DCMWA as indicated by the statute itself, by a comparison of the
statute and the FLSA, and by the resolution of the question whether
Congress, by enacting the Motor Carrier Act and the FLSA, had effec-
tively occupied the field of regulation, thereby preempting any local legisla-
tion which would purport to regulate the wages and hours of employees
with respect to whom the ICC-DOT had the authority to regulate qualifi-
cations and maximum hours of service.
The court began its inquiry into the legislative intent by noting: (1)
that the general scope of the DCMWA was quite broad ;26 (2) that specific
exemptions for certain groups of employees from the Act's overtime
requirements 27 were juxtaposed to that broad coverage; and (3) that
bus drivers were not among those so exempted.2 8 Turning to a considera-
tion of the FLSA, the court noted that the 1966 amendments to the
DCMWA were patterned on the FLSA29 and that, although the FLSA
contained a number of exemptions from its overtime requirements which
were incorporated in the 1966 amendments, the motor carrier exemption
was not one of them. 0 Thus, the court reasoned that this omission should
be considered deliberate and indicative of an intent to include -interstate
motor carriers within the purview of the Act.8 '
The court then considered section 218 of the FLSA 2 which recog-
nizes a 'state's right to establish a minimum wage higher and/or a
maximum work week shorter than those established by the FLSA.38 The
establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles to
ultimate purchasers;(4) any employee employed primarily to wash automobiles by an
employer... ;(5) any employee employed as an attendant at a parking lot or .parking
garage.
24. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 876; S. REP. No. 92-842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
26, 82 (1972).
25. H.R. REP. No. 91-1672, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970).
26 . F.2d at .--- .
27. Id. at
28. Id.
29. Id. at ......
30. Id.
31. Id. at .----
32. Id. at
33. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1970).
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court reasoned that, by "necessary implication,"3 4 section 218 permitted
states to regulate the wages and hours of employees specifically exempted
from the FLSA overtime requirements.35 Giving substantial, if not de-
cisive, weight to the fact that "Congress inserted exemptions [in the
DCMWA] from the overtime compensation requirements for seven classes
of employees, including the substance, and indeed language, of exemption
provisions of FLSA, but omitted the exemption provision set forth in
FLSA, § 213(b) (1) [the motor carrier exemption ],"36 the court con-
cluded that the statutory pattern presented a "reasonably clear pattern of
intent to withhold from the D.C. Act any exemption for employees, of
bus and truck companies, merely because they are subject to ICC regula-
tion due to hours in interstate operations."3 7
The court next considered whether its conclusion concerning legis-
lative intent was valid in light of the argument that a contrary intent
could be inferred if state power to regulate overtime wages of certain
employees of interstate motor carriers had been preempted,3 8 since, in
34. __ F.2d at
35. Id.
36. Id. at _. The court's statement appears to be a slight exaggeration. A
comparison of the DCMWA and FLSA exemptions indicates that Congress tailored
the DCMWA exemptions to fit the local problems and conditions of the District.
Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a), (b) (1970) with D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-404(a),
(b) (1967).
37- .--- F.2d at -... The court's finding of a "reasonably clear pattern of
intent" is not clearly supported by the legislative history. See text accompanying
notes 62-80 infra. However, reluctance to find an exemption not expressly stated
has some support. The Supreme Court, in litigation concerning exemptions to the
FLSA, has recognized that exemptions from such "humanitarian and remedial"
legislation should be narrowly construed, A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S.
490, 493 (1945), and that specificity in stating exemptions strengthens and supports
an implication that employees not so specifically exempted remain within the
coverage of the act. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950).
38. -_ F.2d at _. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had decided
the case on the basis of the local scope of the DCMWA. 268 A.2d at 264. How-
ever, the trial court had questioned the applicability of the DCMWA on the basis
of both the local scope of the Act and the "doctrine of federal supremacy in
matters concerning interstate commerce," Id. at 261-62. W.M.A. Transit had also
argued the latter issue before the instant court. See - F.2d at _
The doctrine of preemption is based on the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 2. Whenever a state law is in direct opposition to a valid federal law,
the state law must fall as invalid under the supremacy clause. Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). If Congress expressly declares that regulations enacted
pursuant to constitutionally delegated power are to be exclusive, states cannot regu-
late the same field. Cf. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961). When there
is both federal and state regulation in the same -field and no direct conflict be-
tween federal and state law nor any express statement of exclusive federal regula-
tion, whether the state regulation is to be considered invalid and federal preemption
implied, is dependent upon an interpretation of the purpose of the federal statute.
Preemption will be found when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
Factors influencing the determination as to whether preemption was intended
are: the federal statute itself and its legislative history (see Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1963)) ; the existence of a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation (Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); the extent of the federal interest in the field (see Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 649-52 (1971)); the degree to which state policy may.be adverse to the
objectives of the federal act (Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.. 52, 67 (1941));
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enacting the 1966 amendments to the DCMWA, Congress purported to
be exercising only that power which would be available to a state legisla-
ture.3 9 The court determined that the fact that the FLSA motor carrier
exemption was designed to eliminate possible conflict in regulation by
different government agencies was of "relatively little significance '40 to
the question of preemption. While agreeing that, in enacting the 1966
amendments, Congress was purporting to act as a state legislature,41 the
court concluded that "state power [to regulate in the field] is not nega-
tived by the doctrine of federal pre-emption." 42 The Williams court was
unwilling to accept the proposition that Congress intended to include the
motor carrier exemption within the 1966 overtime provisions of the
DCMWA solely by relying on "the consequence of the Federal supremacy
doctrine. '43 The court posited that if state power to regulate overtime
wages was to be considered preempted, it would have to be by virtue of
section 304 of the Motor Carrier Act which granted the ICC the power
to regulate maximum hours of service of certain employees of interstate
motor carriers. 44 The court concluded that the vesting of power to regulate
maximum hours of service in a federal agency did not necessarily exclude
state authority to regulate overtime wages.45
Turning to the issue of concurrent power, the court looked to the
Supreme Court decision in Welch v. New Hampshire46 to support its
conclusion that there was no necessary conflict between state overtime
regulations and federal maximum hours regulation.47 Welch involved a
New Hampshire statute which provided for a maximum hour limitation
on continuous motor vehicle operation by one driver.48 After passage of
and the need for national uniformity of regulation (see Florida Lime & AvocadoGrowers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963)).
The general purpose of the doctrine of preemption was aptly articulated in
Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971),
wherein the Court stated:
The Constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever field of law they
operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regula-
tion of the conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority
over the subject matter.
Id. at 285-86.
39. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REc. 750 (1966) (remarks of Senators Javitts and
Morse to the effect that, in passing the minimum wage bill, Congress was actinglike a state legislature) ; H.R. REP. No. 91-1672, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970)(reference to the DCMWA as a local legislative enactment).
Another aspect of the preemption issue not raised in the instant case is
whether the DCMWA itself should be considered "preempted" to the extent that
it conflicts with the FLSA motor carrier exemption. Apparently, it is possible that
congressional action concerning the District of Columbia may be considered "super-
seded" by a prior "national" enactment. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 654-
56 (1971) (dicta).
40. .... F.2d at
41. Id. at
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
47. _ F.2d at __
48. 306 U.S. at 80.
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the Motor Carrier Act but before the ICC had promulgated specific rules
regulating hours of service pursuant to the authorization contained therein,
the Welch Company was cited for violations of the New Hampshire
statute.49 As a defense, the Welch Company argued that the New Hamp-
shire statute had been superseded by the Motor Carrier Act.50 The
Supreme Court held that it could not properly be inferred that Congress
had intended to supersede any state safety measure prior to the imple-
mentation of a suitable federal measure to take its place.5 It should be
noted, however, that the Welch Court assumed, without deciding, that
when the federal regulations became operative, the state statute would
then be superseded.5 2 The Williams court noted that the briefs and record
in the instant case did not indicate any actual ICC-DOT regulation of the
plaintiffs' hours of service and that, therefore, there was "no basis for
finding a termination of the State's concurrent jurisdiction." 53 Relying on
Levinson v. Spector Motor Service,54 the court stated that, even if there
were evidence of such federal regulation, there would not necessarily be
any inconsistency between such federal regulation of maximum hours of
service, for safety purposes, and state regulation of overtime wages for
economic purposes. 5 This proposition rested upon a state's legitimate in-
terest in creating job opportunities through the use of overtime wage
requirements.58 The fact that overtime requirements might reduce the
number of hours that an employee would work within a maximum hours
limit does not necessarily interfere with a regulation which sets the maxi-
mum hours limitation.
Having determined that state overtime wage requirements need not
be, on their face, in conflict with federal regulations and that the entire
field of regulation had not been preempted, the court, nevertheless, recog-
nized that in a given case an overtime wage requirement could be invalid
in its application :T
It may be that a State overtime pay provision might have to be
suspended or terminated as an interference with an ICC-DOT regula-
tion, or as a burden on interstate commerce, but any such contention
would have to be supported by an express DOT determination, or a
factual showing of burden, and not by abstract conception.58
In attempting to ascertain the relevant legislative intent, the court
chose not to examine, in detail, the legislative history of the 1966 anend-
49. Id. at 84.
50. Id. at 80-81.
51. Id. at 85.
52. Id. at 84.
53. F.2d at -----..
54. 330 U.S. 649 (1947).
55. F.2d at
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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ments to the DCMWA.59 A thorough examination of that history raises
serious questions about the court's conclusions concerning legislative intent
and indicates that the court's reasoning may not be as convincing as might
appear upon a cursory review. The preenactment history of the 1966
amendments reveals no statement directly concerned with the question
before the court. Most discussion focused upon the general minimum wage
coverage rather than upon overtime requirements. 0 However, the post-
1966 history of the DCMWA may be somewhat more revealing and in-
dicative of legislative intent.
In 1970, an amendment to the DCMWA was proposed in the House
which would have added an express exemption from the overtime require-
ments for "any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce
Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours
of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act [the Motor Carrier Act]. '' 1 Commenting on
the proposed amendment, the report of the Committee on the District of
Columbia stated:
[Y]our Committee finds that the interpretation made by the Commis-
sioner of the District of Columbia of the amendments in that Act of
October 15, 1966 (P.L. 89-684) [DCMWA], exceeds any intent of
the Congress and is not supported by the most common and elemental
rules of legislative construction. Section 602 of this bill thus becomes
a necessity as an amendment to present law.62
After reviewing the reasons behind the passage of the Motor Carrier Act,
the Committee emphasized that, during the legislative activity culminating
in the 1966 amendments of the DCMWA, there had been no indication
that any of the federal statutes related to hours of employment in the
interstate motor carrier industry should be changed in any way. 63 The
report continued:
In 1938, when Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (29
USC 201-209), it was again confronted with the problem establishing
hours of employment of persons crossing state boundaries in interstate
commerce. Such employees differed from others whose product flowed
into interstate commerce although the individual did not depart from
the boundaries of the state of employment. The Congress, recognizing
the need for uniformity of regulations applying to such interstate
employees, provided that employees subject to Interstate Commerce
Commission regulations as to qualifications and maximum hours of
service be exempt from the hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Congress, in its legislative action on the amend-
59. The court did make reference to certain facets of the history. See, e.g.,
F.2d at __ n.6, ___ n.13.
60. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 648 and H.R. 6494 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1965).
61. H.R. REP. No. 91-1672, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1970).
62. Id. at 61.
63. Id.
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ments to the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act of 1966, heard
no testimony, received no proposals, and made no suggestions in its
recommendations, to repeal any part of the Fair Labor Standards
Act or otherwise alter the provisions in that Act exempting certain
employees of interstate motor carriers from the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. As finally enacted, the amendments to the
Minimum Wage Act of the District of Columbia stood as a local legis-
lative enactement to be enforced in conjunction with the provisions of
national legislation previously enacted by the Congress.6 4
It is clear, then, from this report, that the House Committee did not
view the proposed amendment as a new exemption, but rather as a clarifi-
cation of an already existing exemption. 5
During the House debate on the bill containing the proposed exemp-
tion,6 6 an amendment was offered which would have stricken the exemption
from the bill.6 7 That amendment was soundly defeated.68 The bill then
passed the House and was sent to the Senate. 9 The Senate, however,
was not receptive to the exemption proposed by the House70 and passed
a bill which contained no such exemption. As a result, two versions of
the bill were sent to conference committee.71
The conference committee produced a compromise bill72 which pro-
vided that employees who would have been exempted by the House proposal
would be exempted from the DCMWA overtime provisions only for those
64. Id. The report also contains a short "lesson" on the proper method of
interpretation and implementation of laws which is directed at District officials. Id.
at 61-62.
65. The report stated:
This [exemption] will restore the initial purpose and intent of the Congress
which has been misinterpreted and misapplied without legal justification or valid
economic purpose to the detriment of the economics of the transportation industry
in the District of Columbia.
Id. at 65.
66. Congressman Broyhill of Virginia strongly supported the report's position
and maintained:
Section 602 exempts District of Columbia motor carriers which are regulated
by the ICC from the provisions of the District of Columbia Minimum Wage
Act. The problem in this area is that the District of Columbia Minimum Wage
Board has imposed an overtime provision for all motor carrier employees in the
District. . . . The Fair Labor Standards Act, on the other hand, exempts all
interstate motor carrier employees in the categories of driver, driver's helper,
loader, and mechanic from overtime provisions.
When we passed that Minimum Wage Act of 1966 we did not intend to
include people engaged in interstate commerce who are now subject to regula-
tion by the Department of Transportation. This group has been excluded from
the Fair Labor Standards Act since 1938. In fact, they were exempt under the
law as far back as 1935. When we passed this legislation in 1966, there was
no mention in the hearing or on the floor that it would include people who are
excluded from the Fair Labor Standards Act.
116 CONG. REc. 41401, 41416 (1970).
67. Id. at 41416.
68. Id. at 41417.
69. Id.
70. Nothing was said on the floor of the Senate or in the conference report
which explains the Senate opposition to the House proposal. See 116 CONG. REC.
41796-98, 42988 (1970). H.R. REP. No. 91-1789, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
71. 116 CONG. REc. 41798 (1970).
72. H.R. REP. No. 91-1789, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1970).
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work weeks during which they did not spend more than one-half of their
work time within the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, defining the
metropolitan area as "the area consisting of the District of Columbia,
Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in Maryland, Arlington and
Fairfax Counties and the cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church
in Virginia. ' '7 3 This conference bill was enacted and became law on Janu-
ary 5, 1971.74
That, however, was not the end of congressional discussion and debate
concerning a full motor carrier exemption for the DCMWA. Indeed, the
controversy was rekindled less than one year later when an amendment
to the DCMWA was proposed in the House. That proposal would have
expressly exempted from the overtime requirements of the Act all em-
ployees with respect to whom the DOT had the power to regulate
qualifications and maximum hours of service.75 The House passed the
amendment,7 6 but again, it was opposed without explanation by the
Senate.77 This time, the result of the conference was a compromise which
completely abandoned the proposed House amendment and repealed the
partial exemption passed the previous year.78 The DCMWA, at least as
far as its overtime provisions were concerned, was thereby returned to
the same language and form adopted in the 1966 amendments.
79
Thus, it is difficult to discern a clear picture of the congressional intent
behind the DCMWA overtime provision solely from that Act's legislative
history. Only the position of the House is relatively clear. Although
nothing was said prior to the enactment of the 1966 amendments to the
DCMWA, the post-1966 history shows the House strongly opposed to
any interpretation of the Act's overtime provisions which would hold all
emyployees of interstate motor carriers subject to them. However, except
for a few, somewhat ambiguous remarks by Senator Eagleton,80 nothing
73. Id. at 10.
74. District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-650, § 702 (a) (6),
84 Stat. 1938.
75. H.R. 11341, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1970). See 117 CONG. REc. 10920, 10952(daily ed. Nov. 11, 1971) (remarks of Mr. Broyhill and Mr. Cabell).
76. 117 CONG. REc. 10961 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1971).
77. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-489, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
78. H.R. REP. No. 92-740, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971).
79. The conference compromise did not recommend any change in, or the re-
peal of, the definition of "Washington metropolitan region" that was added to the
DCMWA during the previous year. See Id. at 4.
80. See 117 CONG. REc. 21194 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1971) ; 116 CONG. REC. 42988
(1970). Commenting on the partial exemption compromise reached by the confer-
ence committee in 1970, Senator Eagleton stated: "The amendment retains over-
time compensation coverage for drivers, drivers' helpers, loaders, or mechanics who
spend more than one-half of their workweek in the Washington metropolitan region."
116 CONG. REc. 42988 (1970). This statement could be construed in a number of
ways. For example, it could be argued that the Senate had never intended the 1966
amendments to the DCMWA to embrace the FLSA motor carrier exemption. Such
a construction focuses on Senator Eagleton's use of the word "retains." On the
other hand, still focusing on the word "retains," it could be contended that the state-
ment merely indicates that the Senate in 1970 had taken the position that any ex-
emption embraced by the 1966 amendments should be eliminated, that the compromise
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was said in the Senate explicating its opposition to the House amendments,
and the record is devoid of statements demonstrative of the Senate's
motivation for that opposition. Lacking a more definitive indication of the
Senate's motivation, several explanations are plausible. First. it can be
argued that the Senate never recognized an exemption from the DCMWA
overtime provisions for any employees of interstate motor carriers. This
position views the Senate as being in total opposition to the House and
assumes that the Senate intended the 1966 amendments to the DCMWA
to include all employees of interstate motor carriers within the coverage
of their overtime wage provisions. Such an assumption would view the
narrower exemption passed in 1970 as a partial victory for its House
proponents, in that it created at least a partial exemption where, thereto-
fore, none had existed. The repeal of that partial exemption would, under
this view, be seen as the elimination of any exemption and a return to the
position of 1966, which embraced no exemption. Second, it can be posited
that the DCMWA, as amended in 1966, incorporated the FLSA motor
carrier exemption (or did nothing to negate that exemption) 8 ' but that
the post-1966 developments indicate a congressional decision to limit that
exemption - first partially and, then, completely. This is a feasible in-
terpretation if the Senate is viewed as having agreed with the House that
the exemption did exist in 1966 but as having subsequently decided to
eliminate it. Such an interpretation would mean that the DCMWA, as it
presently exists, though exactly the same as the 1966 version as far as
overtime provisions go, embraces no exemption, but that the 1966 version,
which was at issue for the purposes of the instant litigation, did embrace
the exemption. Third, it can be argued that the DCMWA, as amended in
1966, embraced the FLSA motor carrier exemption, that the partial
reached by the conference committee was between diametrically opposed points of
view (complete exemption and complete coverage), and that Senator Eagleton, re-
porting to his colleagues in the Senate, simply stated that the compromise retained
part of the Senate's 1970 position.
Commenting on the conference compromise reached on the 1971 proposed
amendment, Senator Eagleton stated: "Section 707 of the conference substitute
amends the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act to remove from that act an
exemption from overtime pay for certain drivers, drivers' helpers, loaders, and me-
chanics. These employees will now be entitled to overtime compensation as they
were prior to the adoption of the exemption." 117 CONG. REC. 21194 (daily ed. Dec.10, 1971). This statement could also be construed in several ways. It could be
argued that it supports the view that the Senate always opposed the position that
the 1966 amendments to the DCMWA embraced any motor carrier exemption. On
the other hand, it could be argued that it supports the view that the 1970 partial
exemption was a limitation on the previously existing, but not stated, total exemp-
tion and that the 1971 amendment represented a return to the total exemption which
existed with the 1966 amendments. Such an argument interprets the phrase "as they
were prior to the adoption of the exemption" to imply that an exemption did, in
fact, exist in 1966. The former interpretation, however, is considerably more feas-ible, and warrants the conclusion that Senator Eagleton, at least, viewed the 1966
Act as containing no implied exemption.
81. Such a view can apparently be ascribed to the House. See H.R. REP. No.91-1672, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-65 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 28-32
supra.
DECEMBER 1972]
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss2/10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
exemption of 1970 was meant to limit that exemption, but that the action
of 1971, which repealed the partial exemption, reinstated the complete
exemption.82 Finally, it could even be argued that, since the 1971 amend-
ment proposed by the House was part of an extensive revenue bill, 83 the
Senate refused to accept the amendment merely because a revenue bill of
that size and scope was not the proper vehicle for such an unrelated
proposal.8 4 This argument views the repeal of the partial exemption as
a partial compromise with the House. 5
It is submitted that, in the light of the legislative history and attendant
interpretation problems, the court did not adequately treat the question of
legislative intent. The court's conclusion that there was a "reasonably
clear pattern of intent" that all employees of interstate motor carriers could
be within the purview of the DCMWA overtime provisions might, there-
fore, be subject to valid criticism. Indeed, it has been forcefully argued,
in District of Columbia v. Schwerman Trucking Co.,8 6 a case currently
pending in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,8 7 that the instant
court entirely misinterpreted the legislative intent behind the DCMWA
overtime provisions and that employees exempted from FLSA overtime
82. This argument was made in a case currently pending in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Brief for Appellee at 19, District of Columbia v.
Schwerman Trucking Co., No. 6412 (D.C. Ct. App., filed Mar. 24, 1972). See note
87 infra.
83. The 1971 proposed exemption was offered as an amendment to H.R. 11341,
the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1971. See 117 CONG. REc. 10920 (daily ed.
Nov. 11, 1971). The bill was to provide additional revenue for the District of
Columbia and other purposes. See S. REP. No. 92-489, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
84. This argument must face the fact that H.R. 11341 was many faceted. See
S. REP. No. 92-489, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
85. House members of the conference committee appear to have viewed the
rejection of the House proposed amendment as a defeat. See 117 CONG. REc. 12263(daily ed. Dec. 10, 1971) (remarks of Mr. Cabell to the effect that the House
receded on only two minor amendments).
86. Brief for Appellee at 12-15, District of Columbia v. Schwerman Trucking
Co., No. 6412 (D.C. Ct. App., filed Mar. 24, 1972). The Schwerman Trucking Com-
pany is an interstate motor carrier operating in 30 states and the District of Columbia
under numerous ICC and state certificates of authority. Brief for Appellant at 2.
The company operated a terminal in the District of Columbia from which it trans-
ported bulk cement to Maryland, Virginia, and within the District. The District
of Columbia, as assignee in trust for eleven employees of Schwerman, brought an
action against the company to recover overtime wages allegedly due the employees
under the DCMWA. The plaintiffs were all truck drivers based at the company's
District of Columbia terminal and all spent a substantial amount of their work time
outside the District. However none spent more than 49 per cent of his work time
outside the District and the Maryland counties of Montgomery and Prince Georges,
the Virginia counties of Arlington and Fairfax, and the Virginia cities of Alexandria,
Fairfax and Falls Church. Id. at 2-4. The trial court, citing Williams v. W.M.A.
Transit Co., 268 A.2d 261 (1970), granted the company's motion for summaryjudgment and ordered the suit dismissed. District of Columbia v. Schwerman
Trucking Co., Civil No. GS 18328-70 (D.C. Super. Ct., Feb. 25, 1972). The
District of Columbia appealed. Brief for Appellant at 4.
87. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals is not bound to follow the
decision of the Williams court. As a result of a court reorganization pursuant to the
District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101
et seq. (Supp. 1971), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals became the highest
court in the District, is no longer subject to review by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, id. § 11-102, and is not bound by
decisions of that court rendered subsequent to Feb. 1, 1971. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285
A.2d 310 (1971).
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requirements by the motor carrier exemption were never intended to be
within the coverage of the DCMWA overtime wage provisions. 88
The court's discussion of the preemption issue is also subject to ques-
tion. The court took the position that a state overtime wage provision
would not, on its face, necessarily be in conflict with federal regulation.8 9
While that position may be correct, it is submitted that another aspect of
the preemption question - whether or not the entire field of regulation
had been occupied to the exclusion of state regulation" - was inade-
quately dealt with by the Williams court and therefore casts a shadow on
the court's resolution of that issue. The court's discussion of Welch
supplied some support for the proposition that concurrent state regulation
might be acceptable.9' However, the cursory nature of the court's dis-
cussion of the entire preemption question, its failure to discuss the exist-
ence or nonexistence of a broad federal regulatory scheme (the purpose of
which might be thwarted by state regulation), and the fact that the case
upon which it strongly relied was decided prior to the promulgation of
any regulation pursuant to the enabling statute92 and, thus, prior to the
possible development of a broad scheme of federal regulation, create
doubt about the validity of the court's conclusion that preemption should
not be implied. Indeed, the legislative history of the 1966 amendments
reveals that the House recognized the existence of a national scheme of
regulation 3 and considered federal regulation to be exclusive.94 The weak-
nesses in the Williams approach to the preemption issue have been partially
brought to light in the Schwerman case,95 in which it has also been argued
that state power to regulate in this field has indeed been preempted.90
Additionally, the court's use of section 218 of the FLSA, as evidence
of congressional recognition of the power of states to regulate overtime
wages of employees who are within the FLSA motor carrier exemption,9"
does not conclusively support its assessment of the preemption issue. The
power to improve standards already set is not equivalent to the power to
88. Brief for Appellee at 12-15, District of Columbia v. Schwerman Trucking
Co., No. 6412 (D.C. Ct. App., filed Mar. 24, 1972).
89. F.2d at _
90. A state statute need not be in conflict, on its face, with a federal statute
or regulation for a court to find the entire field of regulation to have been pre-
empted and the state statute, therefore, to be invalid. See note 39 supra.
91. ___ F.2d at _
92. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970).
93. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-1672, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970).
94. Id.
95. District of Columbia v. Schwerman Trucking Co., No. 6412 (D.C. Ct. App.,
filed Mar. 24, 1972).
96. Brief for Appellee at 9-11, District of Columbia v. Schwerman TruckingCo., No. 6412 (D.C. Ct. App., filed Mar. 24, 1972).
It is submitted that Schwerman presents a more attractive vehicle, than did
the instant case, for a court to conclude that preemption should be implied. Schwerman
Trucking is an interstate motor carrier operating in numerous states, and it, more
than the defendant in the instant case, could be drastically effected by any decision
which dictated that it is subject to regulation by the numerous states in which
it operates.
97. __ F.2d at
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set standards which do not exist. Moreover, the latter does not necessarily
flow from the former.
The impact of the instant case, outside the Washington, D.C. area,
9
"
may depend upon the emphasis given to the different aspects of the opinion.
It can be argued that the opinion supports state regulation of overtime
wages of all employees of interstate motor carriers. Such an interpreta-
tion emphasizes the court's conclusion that "state power [to regulate
overtime wages of employees of interstate motor carriers] is not negatived
by the doctrine of federal pre-emption"9 9 and emphasizes the court's view
that there is no inherent inconsistency between federal regulation of
maximum hours of service and state regulation of overtime wages.
100 If
the opinion is given precedential effect according to that view, it could
have substantial adverse effect on the interstate motor carrier industry.
State regulation of overtime wages of employees within the FLSA motor
carrier exemption, in addition to negating the nationwide effect of that
exemption, could seriously interfere with the collectively bargained wage
agreements currently operative throughout much of the interstate motor
carrier industry,1° 1 and could precipitate industrial strife resulting in a
significant restriction upon the nationwide flow of commerce.
°2
However, the opinion does not require such a broad interpretation.
It is submitted that a narrower construction which places emphasis on
the court's recognition that, in a given case, state regulation of overtime
wages may be invalid as applied, is preferable and supported by the unique
circumstances of the case. Moreover, since the local nature of the problem
guided the court's approach, the opinion may be significantly distorted
if not construed with this factor in mind.
The unique size and location of the District of Columbia' 03 creates a
situation in which many employees who, under more "normal" geographical
circumstances would never be considered employees of interstate motor
carriers, fall within that characterization. 10 4 The plaintiffs in the instant
case were essentially local employees'05 who, by a quirk of geographical
fate, fell within that category of employees with respect to whom the
98. The impact of the Williams decision on the Washington, D.C. area could well
be blunted by the forthcoming decision in District of Columbia v. Schwerman Trucking
Co., No. 6412 (D.C. Ct. App., filed March 24, 1972). See notes 87 & 88 supra.
99. F.2d at
100. Id. at ---.
101. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
102. Hearings, supra note 7, at 872-76.
103. Washington, D.C. covers only 67 square miles and has a population density
of 12,401.8 per square mile. In contrast, the smallest state, Rhode Island, covers 1,214
square miles. The District's neighbors, Maryland and Virginia, cover 10,577 and
40,817 square miles respectively. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEe'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, 14,164 (92d ed.).
104. See Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, March 17,
1969. The opinion accepts the characterization of local District of Columbia em-
ployees - drivers for a local furniture retailer, a local bus company, and a local
floor covering company - as employees of interstate motor carriers within the
meaning of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935. Id. at 5.
105. See note 1 supra.
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ICC-DOT had the power to regulate maximum hours of service.' 0 6 The
preemption argument, in effect, asked the court to disregard the local
nature of the case and to deprive the plaintiffs of the protection of the local
District statute merely because unique geographical circumstances had
included them within a broadly defined' 0 7 class of employees.' 08 Had ,the
court found that state power to regulate overtime wages of employees
within the FLSA motor carrier exemption had been preempted, the court
would have had difficulty escaping the conclusion that the DCMWA
overtime provisions, despite the unique situation at bar, did not cover
the plaintiffs. Therefore, in order to be free to consider the operative
scope of the local statute as applied to local employees, the court had to
first establish that state power to regulate in the field had not been pre-
empted. It appears that the court recognized the inherent problems in
resolving the conflict between the local nature of the instant problem and
the national scope of the preemption doctrine. Accordingly, the court
expressly recognized the possibility that a state overtime wage regulation
could be invalid in its application in a given case. 10 9
The above interpretation admits that, although the circumstances of
the instant case required a decision that preemption should not be implied,
that issue should not be considered settled, but should, most properly, be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Thus, an interstate trucking company,
paying its drivers on the basis of an industry-wide, collectively bargained
wage agreement, could resist the imposition of state overtime wage require-
ments on the ground that the state requirements constituted a burden on
interstate commerce. Further, the company could ask the DOT to make
a factual determination that such state requirements were in conflict with
federal regulations. On the other hand, a department store paying its local
drivers on an hourly basis would have a difficult time resisting state over-
time wage requirements solely on the ground that the local drivers occa-
sionally, or even regularly, crossed state boundaries." 0 The difficulty with
a case-by-case approach to the preemption question lies in the possibility
that it could be almost as disruptive as unlimited state authority to regulate
the overtime wages and hours of all employees of interstate motor carriers.
If states were to attempt to enforce overtime wage requirements for all
employees of interstate motor carriers, there would be the overwhelming
106. See note 14 supra.
107. See 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3) (Supp. 1972).
108. Even though the Motor Carrier Act defines "state" to mean "any of the
several States or the District of Columbia," 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (8) (1970), it
would appear that employees in the particular situation that faced the plaintiffs were
not specifically intended to fall within that class of employees with respect to whom
the ICC had the power to regulate qualifications and maximum hours of service. SeeS. REP. No. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1645, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-5 (1935).
109 . ...... F.2d at
110. Cf. Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, March 17,
1969.
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difficulty in adjudicating the appropriateness of all regulations, as applied
to each motor carrier that contested the requirements."1
In conclusion, the instant case would certainly have a significant
impact on the interstate motor carrier industry if regarded and applied
as a broad precedent which supports all state regulation of overtime wages
of all employees of interstate motor carriers. However, while there are
elements of the opinion which support such an interpretation, a narrower
construction is preferable. If narrowly construed, the instant case may be
less disruptive of the interstate motor carrier industry, while still serving
as precedent for the local regulation of overtime wages of essentially local
employees who, by a quirk of geographical fate, are considered employees
with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has the power to
regulate qualifications and maximum hours of service.
Frank H. Griffin, III
Ill. It must be observed that any construction of the opinion must deal with the
contention that the court's discussion of the preemption issue is but dicta, tangentialto its holding. The thrust of the court's inquiry was to discover the relevant legislativeintent, and the preemption argument presented but one indication of that intent.The court concluded, prior to considering the preemption argument, that there was a
"reasonably clear pattern of intent" that all employees of interstate motor carriers be
within the coverage of the DCMWA overtime wage provisions. It is arguable thatthe court could have concluded that intent to either include or exempt was so clear thatthere was no need to consider the preemption argument.
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